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THE INTERSTATE CBTLD AND UNIFORM
LEGISLATION: A PLEA FOR EXTRALITIGIOUS PROCEEDINGS
Albert A. Ehrenzweig*
than a decade ago I posed the problem of the ·"interstate
child': somewhat dramatically, but I believe realistically, as
follows:

M

ORE

After days of bitter contest, a weary judge dissolves the
marriage bond and, lacking Solomon's sword, allots the child to
his mother. Thus the stage is set for the second act of the tragedy. Craving a new life for herself and her child, the mother
moves to another state, and the father, seeing his right of visitation thus put in jeopardy, pleads the mother's removal in the
original court which, loyal to the more faithful citizen, now
awards custody to him. Should a judge of the mother's new
home state heed this change? And again, what should be done
if the father, disappointed by the original court, uses the first
visit to acquire possession and himself removes the child to another state? What is any judge to do when faced with vivid descriptions of a child's plight caused by the alleged misdeeds of
an absent parent or the error of a distant court? Is he to give full
faith and credit or comity to the foreign court's decree and refuse to re-examine the merits of the first award, or should he follow his ovm discretion in caring for the welfare of the child now
within his territory?1
I then proceeded to show that "the courts' answers have been varied,
as varied as human facts and needs." 2 To facilitate prediction, now
hampered by the dogmatic language in the Conflict of Laws Restatement,8 I suggested that courts have, in fact, always felt free
• Walter Perry Johnson Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley.-Ed.

1. Ehrenzweig, Interstate Recognition of Custody Decrees, 51 MICH. L. REv. 345
(1953), revised in SELECTED READINGS ON CONFUcr OF LAws 822 (Culp ed. 1956). See
also Ehrenzweig, Recognition of Out-of-State Custody Decrees in California, in
FAMILY LAW FOR CAUFORNIA LAWYERS 585-94 (Stumpf, Horwitz &: Deal ed. 1956);
Ehrenzweig, Recognition of Custody Decrees Rendered Abroad, 2 AM. J. COMP. L. 167
(1953); Ehrenzweig, El reconocimiento de los mandamientos de custodia extranjeros en
los Estados Unidos, CoNSEJO GENERAL DE. LOS COLECIOS DE A.BOCADOS DE EsPANA (1952);
Ehrenzweig, Zur Anerkennung kindrechtlicher Verfugungen im intemationalen Privatrecht der Vereinigten Staaten, 2 EHE UND FAMILIE 84 (1955).
2. Ehrenzweig, Interstate Recognition of Custody Decrees, supra note I.
3. REsrATEMENT, CoNFLicr OF LAws §§ 144-47 (1934), provides that a foreign decree
which creates "the status of custodianship" will be enforced in -the other states if the
custody -has been awarded by a proper court, i.e., a court of the state of the domicile
of the child. In such a case the original award, whose merits cannot be re-examined,
can be altered only for reasons which subsequently arise and which are deemed suf•
ficient by the forum court.
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either to modify or to disregard a foreign custody decree in
order to safeguard the child's interest. They have refrained from
such action and chosen to enforce such decrees only in certain typical situations in which refusal to do so would benefit a parent with
"unclean hands," except that a foreign decree will even then be
disregarded if it has modified a previous award either exclusively
or at least primarily for the purpose of punishing disobedience. 4
I believe that this suggestion still properly reflects ~urrent practice. 5 However, this practice by no means gives a fully satisfactory
solution. There remains the fundamental problem of when, if ever,
it is justifiable to make the child's welfare depend on his parents'
conduct. Moreover, there remains the all-important fact that individual judges differ in their estimate of human frailties and virtues
so that even those judges willing to accept, in terms or effect, a
"dean-hands" test will often reach different conclusions. Thus, the
losing parent may be encouraged to seek relief outside the state of
his defeat.
When I originally offered my re-interpretation of prevailing
practice, I did not feel that it would be expedient to make suggestions for alternative solutions because I was then convinced that the
courts were doing the very best they could with the procedural tools
at their disposal and that there was little hope for an improvement
of those tools. However, there is such hope now, and the time has
come to help in the search for new answers. In the following discussion, I shall comment on two current proposals for uniform and
federal legislation and shall attempt to formulate a tentative counter-proposal based primarily on foreign experience.
l.

PROPOSED UNIFORM AND FEDERAL LEGISLATION

Upon the request of the Committee on Child Custody of the
Family Law Section of the American Bar Association, Professor
Leonard Ratner has drafted a Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction
Act, which he hopes will alleviate some of the evils now prevailing. 0
4. Ehrenzweig, Interstate Recognition of Custody Decrees, supra note 1, at 373-74.
5. See, e.g., State v. Webster, 151 So. 2d 14 (Fla. Ct. App. 1963), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 822 (1964), petition discharged, 162 So. 2d 905 (1964); McDonald v. Durchard, 357
S.W.2d 583 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962). See also Durk v. Durk, 356 S.W.2d 40 (Ky. 1962)
(clean hands); Ex parte Elliott, 114 Ohio App. 533, 183 N.E.2d 804 (1961); Short v.
Short, 163 Tex. 287, 354 S.W.2d 933 (1962); State v. Kem, 17 Wis. 2d 268, ll6 N.W,2d
337 (1962) (full faith and credit). See generally EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAws §§ 86-89
(1962) (hereinafter cited as TREATISE); EliRENZWEIG 8: LOUJSELL, JURISDICTION IN A NUT•
SHELL §§ 14, 39 (1964). But see REsrATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAws § 151 (Tent.
Draft No. 4, 1957).
6. Ratner, Legislative Resolution of the Interstate Child Custody Problem-A. Reply
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His Draft is based on two major theses, both of which are· designed
to discourage evasive migration: (1) Initial jurisdiction will be reserved primarily to the courts of the state in which the child las_t
resided for at least six consecutive months. 7 Any other court which
acquires jurisdiction on the basis of one of several alternative ,
grounds 8 will dismiss the action if it considers itself to be an inconvenient forum. 9 (2) "In proceedings to modify a decree [of a court of
a sister state having jurisdiction] the court shall give the decree the
res judicata effect that it would have in the court that made it as to
the legal and factual issues adjudicated thereby." 10
These proposals, while clarifying the test of jurisdiction, would ·
preserve the assumption borrowed from the Restatement that recognition is due to custody decrees of a sister state which "has jurisdiction." With that assumption I have taken issue in my Treatise
and several articles; 11 I have suggested that according to the prevailing view, as stated by Chief Justice Traynor in Sampsell v.
Superior Court,,12 several courts concerned ·with a child's welfare
may have concurrent jurisdiction, and that fun• faith and c;redit is
never due to awards of custody. Brainerd Currie supports this propo. sition in an article directed against Leonard Ratner's Draft, but
goes beyond my suggestions by proposing congressional clarification
of the full faith and credit clause "to the effect that no judgment
shall preclude the courts of a state having a legitimate interest in
the matter from making whatever custodial decree is required in
their judgment and discretion, for the welfare_ of the child."18
Ratner has formulated a persuasive counter-argument:
[This] multiple jurisdiction-no full faith and credit solution
reflects the inadequacies of its conventional components: unilateral removal of the child is encouraged and the custody decision
may be made by a forum that is unfairly inconvenient to the
to Professor Currie and a Proposed Uniform Act, 38 So. CAL. L. REv. 183, 196-205
(1965) (hereinafter referred to as tbe Draft). See also Ratner, Child-Custody in a Federal System, 62 Mica. L. REv. 795 (1964). For an excellent discussion of tbe general
problem, see Foster 8: Freed, Child Custody (pts. 1 8: 2), 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 422, 615
(1964).

7. Draft, supra note 6, §§ 2(20), 4(1).
8. Id. § 4(1)·(3).
9. Id. § 7.
10. Id. § 8.
11. See notes 1 8: 5 supra.
12. 32 Cal. 2d 763, 197 P .2d 739 (1948). See also Hentz v. Hentz, 371 Mich. 335, 123
N.W.2d 757 (1963). But cf. Tompkins v. Garlock, 189 Kan. 425, 370 P.2d 131 (1962).
13. Currie, Full Faith and Credit, Chiefly to judgments-A Role for Congress, in ·
SUl'REME CoURT REvmw 89, 115-16 (Kurland ed. 1964).
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stay-at-home parent and far from most of the relevant evidence.
In addition, litigation may proliferate.14
I disagree with Currie's proposal on the further ground that it concedes potential applicability of full faith and credit to custody
awards and may therefore mislead courts in the highly probable
case of congressional inaction. Thus, the issue appears to be joined,
and happily so, for in addition to Ratner's and Currie's drafts there
are now circulating a number of competing proposals which may
ultimately induce the Uniform Law Commissioners to take action
in this vital field.1 5
In partial opposition to all of these proposals, I should like to
submit that any legislation, in order truly to help the interstate
child, must be based on something other than traditional procedures. To be sure, such procedures are in general the least likely
subject for fundamental reform. It is no coincidence that civil procedure in this country, whose substantive law in most fields can
compete in progressive drive and achievement with that of any other
country in the world, is still lagging behind last century's great
reforms in the civil-law world. Nevertheless, in the area of child
custody, if anywhere, we may hope that the profession will be willing, and indeed eager, to avail itself of foreign experience in order
to mitigate some of the hardships which the law has added to the
unavoidable human plight of the interstate child. Here, it is submitted, a re-examination of the traditional adversary approach, with
its concomitant, features of jurisdiction and full faith and credit,
must be the starting point.
O

II. THE NEED FOR NEW Toor..s: EXTRALITIGIOUS (NON-ADVERSARY)
PROCEEDINGS
The inadequacy of adversary proceedings in matters involving
children and other "wards of the court" has been increasingly
recognized. Thus, adoption is now largely carried on under the ex
officio supervision of courts and official or semi-official governmental agencies, and lunacy proceedings show signs of a growing
emphasis on the state's concern.16 Most impor'tant, the fast-growing
14. Ratner, Legislative Resolution of the Interstate Child Custody Problem, supra
note 6, at 193.
15. See, e.g., David E. Engdahl's memorandum of September 21, 1965, on a proposed
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act for the Legislative Research Center of the
University of Michigan Law School. This memorandum also mentions a draft prepared
by Professor Henry H. Foster, which does not yet seem to have been made generally
accessible.
16. See TREATISE § 26, at 85-88; § 51, at 188-90.

November 1965]

The Interstate Child

5

movement for the establishment of family courts17 would concentrate jurisdiction over all intrafamilial legal problems in one court
assisted by experts trained in social work, psychology, and psychiatry, as well as by "law guardians" representing the children.18 One of
the earliest and most distinguished supporters of this movement
has properly suggested: "Why can we not ask what is best for this
family, diagnose the case, find out what caused the rift, and then
apply all the skills of all the professions we can bring to bear on
the problem?"19
This suggestion has been followed to some extent in the Uniform Reciprocal Support of Dependents Act, which has introduced,
over initial resistance, a novel procedure securing a limited cooperation ben\Teen courts of different states for the purpose of safeguarding the interests of deserted wives and children.20 In contrast
to the courts following this procedure, which is still hampered by
some of the by-products of adversary "jurisdiction,"21 tp.e new
family courts offer much greater prospects for impartiality and
efficiency in the protection of the interstate child. Substitution of
extralitigious proceedings in such courts for the adversary process,
which tends to "fan the flames" 22 of discord instead of soothing
them, opens the way for-the solution of the interstate problem so
predominant in child custody cases.23 Tp.e following flight into
what we may hope is not Utopia envisions family courts in each
state, with a nationwide jurisdiction conferred by a new Uniform
Law.
17. See generally Alexander, The Family Court-An Obstacle Race?, 19 U. Pm. L.
R.Ev. 602 (1958); Dembitz, New York Family Court, 48 CORNELL L.Q. 499 (1963); Goldberg & Sheridan, Family Courts-An Urgent Need, 8 J. Pus. L. 337 (1959); Kay, The
.family Court, in CALIF. AssEMBLY JUD. INTERIM COMMITI'EE HEARINGS ON DOMESTIC
'RELATIONS, app. C, Aug. 13, 14, 1964; Ralls, The King County Family Court, 28
WASH. L. R.Ev. 22 (1953); Symposium-New York Family Court Act, 12 BUFFALO L. REv.
409 (1963).
18. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1962, chs. 687, 700, 702, 703. See also note 26 infra.
19. Alexander, The Therapeutic Approach, Univ. Chicago Law School Conference
on Divorce, Conf. Series No. 9 (1952) 51-54. See also Comment, 73 YALE L.J. 151 (1963).
For a retrogressive trend concerning the treatment of juvenile delinquents, see, e.g.,
Handler, The Juvenile Court and the Adversary System, 1965 WIS. L. REv. 7; cf. Dembitz, supra note 17, at 518. See also note 43 infra.
20. See TREATISE 188-90.
21. See note 40 infra.
,
22. Alexander, Legal Science and the Social Sciences-The Family Court, 21 Mo.
L. REv. 105, 107 (1956).
23. Professor Ratner has kindly drawn my attention to the fact that the following
provisions of his Draft would approach extralitigious proceedings in the sense here
suggested: § 3(5) permits any interested party to participate and allows the court to
bring in additional parties on its own motion; § 12 provides for cooperation between
states in making investigations; and § 8 permits a court to familiarize itself with
earlier evidence. But see text accompanying note 39 infra.
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In the field of child custody, I submit that something like the
following pattern should be the ultimate aim of legislative reform.
In the most frequently arising situation-that of the child from a
dissolved marriage-the court pronouncing the divorce, annulment,
or separation will, except in "migratory" cases,24 be the court of the
child's "permanent abode" 25 and will immediately assume jurisdiction over any child of the dissolved marriage. Subsequently,
whenever a petition is filed or information rendered by parents,
other relatives, strangers, or government agencies, that court will,
as the court of guardianship, take any action it considers appropriate
and will also assemble a dossier registering all such actions and all
pertinent information. The court will not rely on either parent for
the needed initiative in its effort to safeguard the child's interest,
but rather, on its own motion, will appoint a curator26 (preferably
but not necessarily with the parents' consent), who will represent
the child in all proceedings under the court's supervision. This
curator need not, and usually should not, be a Ia-wyer but rather a
friend of the court willing to serve without compensation.27 If competent, gratuitous services are not available or if a lawyer is required, the expense will be borne either by the parent owing a duty
of support or by the state or county. Possibly the local district attorney could be charged with a function in this area similar to
his responsibilities in interstate support proceedings.28
A court which has acquired jurisdiction by virtue of "migratory" divorce, separation, annulment, or custody proceedings and
thus lacks the proper factual rationale for such jurisdiction (permanent abode) will, ex officio or upon motion, seek to ascertain
the court which, by virtue of the child's permanent abode in its
24. See text following note 42 infra.
25. This term is tentatively proposed to avoid technical differences between the
various domicile concepts which prevail in the several states and which may prove
bother.;ome with respect to ,the child's derivative domicile. See TREATISE § 136, at 873.
It is to eliminate the corresponding problem on an international level that the Hamburg Draft Convention, infra note 45, art. l, uses the term "ordinarily resident," and
the Hague Convention, infra note 29, art. l, uses the term "habitual residence."
26. This civil law institution is known in at least four states. See TREATISE § 14, at
45; § 26, at 82; § 51, at 190. If a curator had represented the child in Yarborough v.
Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202 (1933), the problem of protecting the child against her
mother's independent·.waiver of future ·support rights might never have arisen. See
also Haag v. Barnes, 9 N.Y.2d 554, 175 N.E.2d 441 (1961), where an illegitimate child
was deprived of a fatlier and permanent support through her mother's financial deal.
Cf. Ehrenzweig, The "Bastard" in the Conflict of LawS-A National Disgrace, 29 U.
CHI. L. REv. 498 (1962). See generally TREATISE § 85. See also note 18 supra.
27. See Kubie, Provisions for the Care of Children of Divorced Parents-A New
Legal Instrument, 73 YALE L.J. 1197 (1964).
28. See TREATISE § 82, at 270-7L ·
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territory, can most effectively protect the child's welfare, and transfer to that court the child's dossier, as well as jurisdiction for any
future proceedings. A similar transfer may be requested by a competent court of any state to which the child is removed with a view
to establishing a permanent abode. The court thus taking permanent jurisdiction will be known as the child's guardianship court.
Such a system has long been in operation between sovereign
nations which have fundamentally different legal rules.29 Should
it not therefore be feasible between the states of this Union with
· their closely related legal rules and strong incentives for effective
cooperation? It will appear that neither the Draft's advocacy of increased res judicata recognition of sister states' decrees30 nor the
doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction recognized in the Sampsell
case81 are irreconcilable with this suggested reform.
A. Res Judicata
One conflict in this regard between the Draft, its cnt1cs, and
the proposed solution disappears once we draw the needed distinction between the full faith and credit requirement as applied to the
custody award itself and to the adjudication of individual facts and
issues. We may safely assume, although this assumption should be
verified by the draftsmen of new legislation, that there is no state
in the Union which does not treat custody decrees as modifiable
upon proof of changed circumstances or which, in other words, does
not treat every new petition as a new cause of action. Thus, since
the full faith and credit accorded to the judicial decree of a sister
. 29. See, e.g., Austrian Jurisdiktionsnorm § 111 (Aug. 1, 1895, RGBI. 111): "If this
seems indicated in the interest of a ward and particularly if there is expected therefrom the promotion of an effective exercise of the ward's protection, the competent
guardianship court may on its own motion or upon petition, transfer in whole or in
part its jurisdiction over the ward's person..••" (Author's translation.) Section 185 of
the Austrian Code on Extralitigious Proceedings (Aug. 9, 1854, RGBl. 208) provides in
part: "The [guardianship] court may in its discretion, in important or doubtful cases,
prior to any decision upon petition by the guardian or curator, hear the ward's available close relatives or the ward himself•••." (Author's translation.)
The primary, continuing difficulty as between the countries of the civil-law orbit
is caused by competing nationality and domicile principles. See TREATISE § 136. Thus,
this is the principal object to which international agreements have so far been di·
rected. See The 9th Hague Conference on Private International Law, Draft Convention Concerning the Powers of Authorities and the Law Applicable in Respect of the
Protection of Infants, Report, 9 AM. J. COMP. L. 708 (1960). See also Miiller-Freienfels,
Legal Equality of Husband and Wife and the Child's Welfare in Private International
Law, in EssAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE IN HONOR OF ROSCOE POUND 595-648 (1962); VOSKUIL,
DE INTERNATIONALE BEVOEGDHEID VAN DE NEDERLANDSE RECBTER (1962); Marin L6pez,
Los conflictos de leyes en materia de tutela, 13 REv. F.sP. DER. INT. 413 (1960).
30. Draft, supra note 6, § 8.
.
31. Sampsell v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 2d 763, 197 P.2d 739 (1948).
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state never exceeds the effect that the issuing state would give to it,
full faith and credit to the custody award as such is never required. 32 However, the fact of that award-the adjudication of the
right to custody as of the time the determination was made-is as
clearly entitled to recognition under the full faith and credit clause
as is the adjudication of any fact or issue fully litigated in the proceedings underlying the award. 33 Collateral estoppel precludes relitigation of such facts and issues in the same manner as it does in
tax cases involving two different taxable years, 34 and is here endowed with full faith and credit as it is in workmen's compensation
cases litigated under the statutes of two different states. 30 The
decree of a sister state is denied full faith and credit in so far as
it purports directly to affect title to forum land. The custody
decree of a sister state is similarly denied full faith and credit in so
far as it purports to affect a child's custody. However, such a decree
is, by virtue of the full faith and credit clause, "entitled in [the
forum] court to the force and effect of record evidence of the equities therein determined, unless it be impeached by fraud." 36 1£ the
Draft provision concerning res judicata37 is thus understood, it is
hardly open to objection.
This result will offer relief to a parent if an attempt is made by
the other to relitigate such incidental issues as paternity, validity
of a marriage, ownership of certain property, or the status of certain
employment. Nevertheless, this result will, and of course should,
leave great leeway concerning those issues as to which a "change of
circumstances" is asserted. Since the adjudication of such changes
is often a matter of individual value judgments, the temptation to
seek a change of venue remains great, particularly under the Sampsell-Currie thesis of concurrent: jurisdiction.88 Does the Draft do
enough to counter the temptation? I do not think so.
To be sure, the Draft provides that the second court "may famil32. See Bachman v. Meijas, l N.Y.2d 575, 136 N.E.2d 866 (1956); TREATISE § 87, at
290-91; Comment, 49 IowA L. R.Ev. 1178 (1964). Regarding international equivalents,
see, e.g., Gamillscheg, Herausgabe eines Schweizer Kindes, 23 RAnELS ZErrsCHRIFI' 145,
148 (1958). See generally KEGEL, INTERNATIONALES PRlvATRECHT 346-53 (2d ed. 1964):
Webb, Wardship of Court and the Conflict of Laws, 14 INT. &: COMP. L.Q. 663 (1965).
33. Ogletree v. Crates, 363 S.W.2d 431 (I'ex. 1963); Mitchell v. Mitchell, 369 S.W.2d
684, 687 (I'ex. Civ. App. 1963) (mother's use of intoxicants). See also Foster &: Freed,
Child Custody, 39 N.Y.U.L. R.Ev. 423, 615, 625 (1964).
34. Commissioner v. Sunnen, 353 U.S. 591 (1948).
35. See, e.g., McGehee Hatchery Co. v. Gunter, 234 Ark. 113, 350 S.W.2d 608 (1961).
36. Redwood Inv. Co. v. Exley, 64 Cal. App. 455, 221 Pac. 973, 975 (1923), approved
in Rozan v. Rozan, 49 Cal. 2d 322, 317 P.2d 11 (1957) (Traynor, J.).
37. Draft, supra note 6, § 8.
38. See notes 12, 13, 31 supra and accompanying text.
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iarize itself with evidence presented in the prior proceedings by
reading a transcript of such evidence or a summary agreed to by
the parties or approved by the judge who heard it. . . ." 39 Unfortunately, this provision continues to follow the pattern of adversary proceedings, which is so clearly inappropriate in this area.
As was suggested earlier, any judge intent on doing justice to the
interstate child must., whenever feasible, avail himself of all the
evidence bearing on his crucial decision, and no transcript of adversary proceedings, let alone a "summary agreed to by the parties,"
will do for this purpose. The judge has to try to learn all there is
to know about the entire situation.

B. Jurisdiction
Once the courts' independence and interdependence are thus
established in relation to prior proceedings in a sister state, it becomes all the more important to ascertain the forum in which the
new proceedings can be properly entertained.
A concept of jurisdiction which has been developed entirely for
purposes of adversary processes has hampered the recognition of
what have long been recognized abroad as the exigencies of a separate category of extralitigious proceedings in which the state,
through its judicial and administrative agencies, acts, with the parties' assistance, as parens patriae. It is particularly in conflicts cases
that the adversary concept of jurisdiction is responsible for much
of the difficulty. Thus, even under the new Uniform Support Act,
support duties can still be imposed only by the deserter's responding state, although it is the dependent's initiating state which is
usually more familiar with the latter's needs and thus more able
to 'exercise a centralized control over his affairs.40 In the interstate
law of child custody we are similarly threatened with that obsolete
scheme of personal jurisdiction which even in adversary proceedings
is quickly losing both meaning and effect,41 and which in parens
patriae proceedings lacks both foundation and purpose.42
39. Draft, supra note 6, § 8. (Emphasis added.)
40. For a proposal that would, within the newly emerging system of a nearnationwide jurisdiction, shift the decision to the dependent's state, see TREATISE § 84,
at 278-79; Bhrenzweig, Interstate Recognition of Support Duties, 42 CALIF. L. REY. 382,
396-99' (1954); Lyman, Proposed Amendments of the California Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, 42 CALIF. L. REY. 400 (1954).
41. See TREATISE §§ 27-33; Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction
-The "Power" Myth and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289 (1956).
42. We may hope that May v. Anderson, 315 U.S. 428 (1953), which could be interpreted as requiring such jurisdiction in custody cases, will remain limited to its facts.
See TREATISE § 87, at 292. However, abolition of the adversary approach should not,
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I submit that there is a fundamental need for concentrating
the responsibility for the interstate child at any one time in one
court-the "guardianship court" in the parlance of other countries.
As suggested earlier, this ordinarily exclusive jurisdiction should
probably be in the state of the child's permanent abode, which,
except in migratory cases, will usually coincide with the state in
which the marriage dissolution or separation was obtained. It is
that court which will have to make ultimate decisions and which
will, for that purpose, keep the child's dossier containing all information obtained by any means, not only in adversary proceedings
between the parents but also through welfare agencies, court investigators, or the police.43 Other courts exercising temporary jurisdiction by virtue of the child's transient presence or by virtue of
nondomiciliary or pseudo-domiciliary divorce proceedings may be
authorized to take emergency measures,44 but such courts should
at any time yield to the guardianship court of the child's permanent
abode, which is in a better position to supervise his welfare. The
Sampsell rule of an altruistically exercised concurrent jurisdiction
would thus prevail over both the Draft's complex attempt to adapt
unadaptable adversary concepts and Currie's anarchic jurisdiction
of all states with a "legitimate interest."
Perhaps issue can be joined most easily and effectively if the
new beginning urged in these pages is formulated as a proposed rival
Draft Uniform Act.
III. COUNTER-PROPOSAL FOR A UNIFORM INTERSTATE CUSTODY

ACT'1G

Article 1. Permanent Jurisdiction: The Guardianship Court
a. At any one time there shall be only one guardianship court
for any child whose custody requires judicial action owing to the
lack of, abuse or neglect by, or conflict benveen natural parents.
of course, deprive parents of their natural right to participate in the proceedings
whenever possible.
43. Ex officio jurisdiction is of course not foreign to the Anglo-American legal sys•
tem. The entire concept of Chancery process determined by the "King's conscience"
supports this institution. On the history and relative merits of ex officio and adversary
proceedings in the supervision of trusts, sec, e.g., Fratcher, Fiduciary Administration
in England, 40 N.Y.U.L. REv. 12 (1965). See also note 20 supra,
44. See, e.g., Dolle, tJber einige Kernprobleme des internationalen Rechts der frei•
willigen Gerichtsbarkeit, 27 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFl' 201, 220-25 (1962).
45. This proposal is patterned in part on Professor Ratner's Draft, supra note 6, and
in part on the Hamburg Draft Convention of the Recognition of Orders on the Cus•
tody of Infants, 49th Conference of the International Law .Association, 1960. See Docu•
ment, 9 .AM. J. COMP. L. 519-21 (1960). For another draft, see Kegel, Zur Reform des
deutschen internationalen Yormundschafts-und Pflegschaftsrechts, in 2 VoM DEtJTSCHEN
ZUM EtlROPAISCHEN RECHT (FESTSCHRIFT FUR DoLLE) 217, 241-56 (1963).
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Such court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to issue a permanent
custody decree and establish and maintain a dossier containing all
pertinent facts and proceedings.
b. If no other court has'previously acted as a guardianship court,
the guardianship court shall be that court in whose territory the
child has his permanent abode and has been present for at least
six months. Otherwise, such jurisdiction shall be acquired only,
through transfer. While the guardianship court shall make every
effort to secure personal jurisdiction over all· natural and adoptive
parents, such jurisdiction shall not be required.
Article 2. Temporary Jurisdiction
a. Any court in whose territory the child is present shall in
cases of urgent need have temporary jurisdiction to issue a temporary custody decree and shall advise the guardianship court of any
action taken. Such jurisdiction may also be assumed by any court
in which proceedings for divorce, annulment, or separation are
commenced. Upon the completion of six months of presence and
the acquisition of a permanent abode by any child within the territory of the court thus exercising temporary jurisdiction, the court
exercising such jurisdiction shall request the guardianship court
for a transfer of its jurisdiction and of the child's dossier. The
guardianship court shall comply with such request if it finds the
child's presence and change of permanent abode established to its
satisfaction.
b. If no court has yet acted as the guardianship court, the court
of temporary jurisdiction shall assume juri~ction as the guardianship court upon the completion of six months of presence and the
acquisition of a permanent abode by the child within its territory.
Article 3. Jurisdiction To Rescind or Modify
Any court having permanent or temporary jurisdiction may rescind or modify a (previous) decree after having secured such records, transcripts and other information as may be available in the
court which has made such decree or elsewhere; provided that a
prior decree shall have the res judicata effect that it would have in
the court that made it as to the legal and factual issues adjudicated
thereby; and provided further that if the child has been removed
in an attempt to seek a change of custody in disobedience to such
decree, only the guardianship court shall order such rescission or
modification.
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CONCLUSION

This Draft Uniform Act is of course offered merely as a starting
point for further discussion and as an illustration of the need for
and the potential value of examining r foreign legal systems and
thoughts.
The American Bar Association has had the courage and the
foresight to initiate the preparation of a Uniform Act. For many
years it has also repeatedly and consistently stressed the overriding
importance and promise of international cooperation. Would it be
amiss then to suggest that the Association and other draftsmen of
uniform legislation should, before taking the final steps toward the
adoption of a Uniform Interstate Custody Act, engage in a thorough
study of solutions developed elsewhere during the past century for
problems which are identical with ours in both legal and human
terms?

